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This paper examines the relation between corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate 
structure.  We find that the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing 
firm’s largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the 
firm’s loan syndicate.  When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form 
syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts.  These 
syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and comprised of domestic banks that are 
geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the 
industries of the borrowers.  We also examine factors that influence the relation between 
ownership structure and syndicate structure, including firm opacity, presence of multiple large 
owners, bank reputation, lending relationship, law and institution, and financial crises. 
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Over the past two decades, the syndicated loan market has become the most important 
source of global corporate financing.  International syndicated lending amounted to $1.8 
trillion in 2009, surpassing the $1.5 trillion of corporate borrowing in international bond 
markets (Chui et al., 2010).  Unlike a traditional bank loan, which typically involves a single 
creditor, a syndicated loan unites a group of lenders in which a lead arranger originates the loan 
and performs due diligence and monitoring, and the participant banks fund parts of the loan 
(Esty, 2001).  The syndication process therefore generates an additional element of moral 
hazard within the syndicate between the lead arranger and the other syndicate members, besides 
the typical agency problems between the borrower and the lender that exist in a lending 
relationship (Diamond, 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).  Despite the importance of 
syndicated loans and the uniqueness of the syndication process, little is known about how loan 
syndicates are structured to address and mitigate moral hazard problems both at the borrowing 
firm and within the syndicate. 
In this paper, we focus on the divergence between corporate ownership and control at the 
borrowing firm to explore how corporate ownership structure influences the bank loan 
syndicate structure.  In many publicly listed firms around the world, control rights of the 
dominant shareholders often exceed their cash-flow rights via the use of dual-class shares, 
pyramidal structures, and multiple control chains (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2000; Laeven and Levine, 2008, 2009; Gompers et al., 2010).  In such firms, the controlling 
shareholders have the ability to divert corporate wealth for private benefits without bearing the 
full financial consequences, and therefore have strong incentives to engage in tunneling and 
other moral hazard activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000a).1  Many of 
                                                              
1  Various forms of such activities by controlling shareholders are documented in developed countries as well 
as developing countries.  They include outright theft or fraud, expropriation of corporate opportunities, and 
self-serving financial transactions such as transfer pricing, inter-corporate loans, asset sales at favorable prices to 
controlling shareholders, etc. (e.g., Djankov et al., 2008).   
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these activities increase the default risks, impair collateral values and, as a consequence, 
increase the expected costs of financial distress (Lin et al., 2011).2  In anticipation of the 
increased credit risk, more intense due diligence and monitoring efforts are required before 
lending takes place.  However, as suggested in the framework of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), 
the lead arranger has an incentive to shirk the monitoring responsibilities, especially when more 
intense monitoring is required, because the monitoring efforts are costly and unobservable, and 
the lead arranger only owns part of the loan.  The lead arranger bears most of the costs for the 
due diligence on the borrower ex ante and the monitoring of the borrower ex post yet retains 
only a fraction of the loan.  Therefore, the lead arranger may lack the incentive to provide the 
optimal level of efforts (Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009).  Participant banks should take the lead 
arranger’s moral hazard problem into account and demand that a greater fraction of the loan be 
held by the lead arranger for incentive purposes if the borrowing firm requires more due 
diligence and monitoring.  Moreover, a larger portion of the loan retained by the lead arranger 
not only signals a credible commitment by the lead arranger in due diligence and monitoring, 
but also provides a strong signal of borrower quality (Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009). Therefore, 
the fraction held by the lead arranger of a syndicated loan should be increasing in the 
divergence between control and cash-flow rights of the borrowing firm’s dominant shareholders.  
It follows that syndicates lending to firms with large control-ownership deviations should be 
more concentrated than those lending to firms with small deviations.  
On the other hand, there might be countervailing factors that induce a diffuse syndicate 
ownership structure in the face of control-ownership divergence.  Diffuse loan ownership can 
facilitate diversification of risk exposure across lenders (Esty and Megginson, 2003).  As the 
credit risks increase with the corporate control-ownership divergence, creditor diversification 
incentives also increase.  In addition, a more diffuse syndicate ownership makes renegotiation 
                                                              
2  For instance, Friedman et al. (2003) report that bankruptcy cases in many countries are associated with 
complete looting by controlling shareholders, leaving the creditors practically nothing when the firms go bankrupt.   
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more difficult and restructuring more costly (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1996; Brunner and Krahnen, 2008).  As a consequence, diffuse loan ownership 
can be used as a pre-commitment mechanism by lenders to deter strategic defaults (Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1996; Esty and Megginson, 2003).  Therefore, if creditors are concerned with 
strategic defaults by the borrowing firms when there is a large divergence between corporate 
control and cash-flow rights, a diffuse syndicate ownership might be preferred.  In this regard, 
the creditors’ incentives to form a more diffuse syndicate might be increasing in the divergence 
between corporate control and cash-flow rights.  These considerations suggest a negative 
relation between corporate control-ownership divergence and syndicate concentration.  The 
overall effect of corporate control-ownership divergence on syndicate concentration is an 
empirical question that we will explore in this study.  
The divergence between ownership and control at the borrowing firm can also affect the 
composition of the loan syndicate, including foreign lender participation and the overall lending 
expertise of the syndicate members.  It is well documented that greater physical distance 
between the lender and the borrower makes the ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring more 
difficult and generates higher agency costs (Stein, 2002; Esty, 2004).  The distance-driven 
agency costs are further aggravated by the agency problems induced by the control-ownership 
divergence at the borrowing firms.  As a result, foreign banks might be less willing to lend to 
such firms that require monitoring-intensive relationship loans.  Moreover, as Esty (2004) 
suggests, foreign banks are more susceptible to expropriation risks because they are often 
treated unfairly in corporate default situations, especially in relational functions such as debt 
restructuring or collateral seizing.3  Therefore, we expect the syndicate participation rate of 
foreign lenders to be negatively related to the divergence between control and cash-flow rights 
of the dominant shareholders of the borrower.  
                                                              
3 Esty (2004) reports numerous cases on discrimination against foreign creditors in various countries 
including the U.S.  One vivid example involves Jasmine International, a Thai telecommunications company 
founded by Thailand's commerce minister and controlled by his family.  After the company went into financial 
distress during the Asian financial crisis and had to restructure its debt, it proposed to repay its local creditors in 
full while repaying less than 20% of the debt owed to foreign lenders.  
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The lending expertise of the syndicate also may be affected by the divergence between 
ownership and control at the borrowing firm.  Lender loan portfolio concentration in a 
particular industry is driven by synergies in information collection and monitoring (Ivashina, 
2009).  Banks with industry-specific expertise are more likely than other banks to lend to 
borrowers that require industry-specific knowledge and intense monitoring, such as firms with 
great tunneling risks caused by large divergences between ownership and control.  
Furthermore, given the heightened risks and the potential need for joint monitoring at such 
firms, the lead arranger is likely to select participant lenders based on their familiarity with the 
borrowing firm’s industry sector.  Syndicates lending to firms with large control-ownership 
divergences, therefore, are likely to be comprised of banks with expertise and experience in 
lending to firms in the borrower’s industry.   
Our empirical analysis finds evidence that is consistent with our expectations.  
Specifically, we use a novel, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership and control of 
3,056 firms in 22 Western European and East Asian countries from 1996 to 2008 to examine the 
relation between the control-ownership divergence at borrowing firms and the structure of 
lending syndicates.  We obtain detailed information on 14,350 syndicated loans made to these 
sample firms, and for each firm, we track its ownership chain and compute the cash-flow and 
control rights of its ultimate largest owner.  Our results indicate that the divergence between 
control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm’s largest ultimate owner has a 
significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm’s loan syndicate.  Ceteris 
paribus, a one-standard-deviation increase in the control-ownership divergence at the borrowing 
firm increases the amount of the loan held by the lead arranger by 14% and increases average 
syndicate concentration measured by a Herfindahl index by 17%.  With respect to the 
syndicate composition, a one-standard-deviation increase in the divergence is associated with a 
19% decrease in foreign bank participation (based on the number of foreign lenders in the 
syndicate and the percentage of loan held by all foreign lenders) and a 16% increase in the 
overall syndicate lending expertise related to the borrowing firm’s industry.  The estimated 
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effects of the control-ownership divergence on syndicate structure are both economically and 
statistically significant.  
We further examine the factors that influence the relation between the control-ownership 
divergence and the syndicate structure to explore the channels through which the tunneling and 
self-dealing risks and the associated monitoring needs induced by the control-ownership 
divergence at the borrowing firm can be exacerbated or mitigated.  We find that if the lead 
arranger has a strong reputation and prior lending relationships with the borrowing firm, the 
relation between control-ownership divergence and syndicate structure is weaker than otherwise.  
Similarly, law and institutions such as strong shareholder rights and good credit information 
sharing systems, which constrain self-dealing activities and impose market-based discipline, 
moderate the relation between control-ownership divergence and syndicate structure.4   
On the other hand, our results indicate that the effect of the excess control rights on loan 
syndicate structure is more pronounced for firms with higher degrees of informational opacity 
such as small firms, firms without credit ratings, and firms with low analyst coverage.  
Moreover, we also investigate the effect of the difference in cash-flow rights dispersion 
between the largest and second largest shareholders of the borrowing firm on the relation 
between syndicate structure and control-ownership divergence.  Laeven and Levine (2008) 
argue that unequal distribution of cash-flow rights across large owners impedes external 
monitoring and thus enhances the ability of the controlling shareholder to divert corporate 
resources for private benefits.5  Accordingly, we find that the dispersion of cash-flow rights 
across large owners amplifies the effect of the control-ownership divergence on syndicate 
structure.   
                                                              
4 Strong shareholder rights reduce self-dealing and tunneling activities (Djankov et al., 2008).  Information 
sharing among creditors improves banks’ knowledge of the characteristics and credit histories of borrowers and 
applicants (Barth et al., 2009), and in addition, works as a post-lending disciplining device by making it more 
difficult for borrowers with negative histories (e.g., late repayment, default, etc.) to get access to credit in the future 
(Padilla and Pagano, 1997; Houston et al., 2010).  
 
5 Laeven and Levine (2008) also show that the cash-flow rights dispersion between the largest and the second 
largest shareholders is negatively related to firm value.  
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We examine also the relation between control-ownership divergence and syndicate 
structure during financial crises.  Financial crises represent relatively exogenous shocks that 
reduce the return on investment of all firms, thereby increasing the difficulty of investor 
monitoring and lowering the marginal cost of insiders’ expropriation activities (Johnson et al., 
2000b; Johnson and Mitton, 2003).  Consistent with this notion, we find that the effect of 
control-ownership divergence on syndicate structure is particularly strong for borrowers in 
countries experiencing financial crises.  
One potential source of concern for our empirical analysis is the issue of endogeneity.  
While it is rather unlikely that a borrowing firm determines its ownership structure as a direct 
function of the syndicate structure of its loan, the borrower might have characteristics 
unaccounted for in our study that jointly determine the control-ownership divergence and the 
syndicate structure.  The consistent results from the sharper interaction tests on factors that 
affect the divergence-syndicate structure relation help to alleviate this concern.  In the spirit of 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), one way to overcome some of the endogeneity concerns is to focus 
on the details of theoretical mechanisms through which corporate ownership structure affects 
syndicate structure, and document their working.  The various interaction term effects 
discussed above could in effect be viewed as “the ‘smoking gun’ in the debate about causality” 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  Moreover, it is less likely to have an omitted variable correlated 
with the interactive terms than with the linear term (Raddatz, 2006).  Thus, from an 
econometric perspective, the interactive term approach is also less subject to endogeneity 
concerns (Claessens and Laeven, 2003).  In sum, the various interaction test findings show 
direct evidence about how corporate ownership structure affects syndicate structure, thus 
providing a stronger test of causality and alleviating endogeneity concerns. 
Furthermore, we perform two additional tests to address the endogeneity issue.  First, we 
test the robustness of the results by including country×year fixed effects and industry×year 
fixed effects, respectively.  The inclusion of these fixed effects controls for the omitted 
industry and country effects that might affect syndicate structure and thus helps to mitigate the 
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endogeneity concerns.  Second, we instrument for each borrower’s control-ownership 
divergence and cash-flow rights using the initial industry average control-ownership divergence 
and the initial industry average cash-flow rights in the borrower’s industry as respective 
instruments (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Lin et al., 2011).  As Laeven and Levine (2009) 
suggest, an individual firm’s ownership structure is correlated with the industry average 
ownership structure.  However, it is unlikely that the industry ownership structure directly 
affects the syndicate structure of any particular loan of the borrowing firm except through the 
borrower’s ownership structure.  The estimation results remain economically and statistically 
significant using either approach, further alleviating the concern that endogeneity biases our 
main findings.   
In focusing on how bank financing is arranged to mitigate the agency costs associated with 
the divergence between ownership and control in an international context, this paper contributes 
to the ownership structure literature (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002; Laeven 
and Levine, 2008), the financial contracting literature (e.g., Sufi, 2007; Qian and Strahan, 2007; 
Graham et al., 2008; Campello et al., 2010; Demiroglu and James, 2010a), and the international 
banking literature (e.g., Beck et al., 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Houston et al., 2010).  
Taken together, our results suggest that corporate ownership structure has a significant impact 
on bank loan syndicate structure.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights in the borrowing firms exacerbates 
potential tunneling and other agency problems by large shareholders, thereby increasing the 
credit risk faced by lenders.  Consequently, when the deviation between the control and 
cash-flow rights of a borrower’s dominant shareholder is large, lead arrangers respond by 
forming syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts.  
These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated, with the lead arrangers holding a relatively 
large fraction of the loan.  Moreover, the syndicates tend to be comprised of domestic banks 
that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to 
the industries of the borrowers.  
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the sample 
construction process and variable definitions.  Section 3 presents the empirical results.  
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and variables 
 
2.1. Sample construction 
 
We start building our sample using the combined data sets in Claessens et al. (2000) and 
Faccio and Lang (2002).  These two data sets contain ownership and control information 
during the 1996–1999 period for the corporations in 22 Western European and East Asian 
countries (regions) including Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.  We then 
manually match these firms by name to the Dealscan database provided by Thomson Reuters.  
To be retained in the sample, a firm must have detailed information available on its loan 
contracts and transactions in Dealscan’s coverage of the global loan markets. 
Next, we hand-collect information on ultimate ownership and control for the sample firms 
beyond 1999 and up to 2008.6  To make the manual collection workload manageable, we 
follow Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) and augment the ownership data for 
the 2000–2008 period in three blocks: 2000–2003, 2004–2006, and 2007–2008.7  We use 
years 2002, 2005, and 2007 as the base years for information collection.  If firm ownership 
data cannot be located in a base year, we search the other years in the corresponding block 
                                                              
6 Lin et al. (2011) use a similar sample construction methodology; see the paper for a detailed discussion. 
 
7 The 1996–1999 ownership data in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) are computed at a 
chosen year between 1996 and 1999.  Over short time periods, firm ownership structures do not tend to vary much 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002).  
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period.  To track each firm’s ownership chain, we use the Factset, OSIRIS, and Worldscope 
global databases.8  Since large shareholders of a firm are often corporations themselves, we 
trace backward the control chain through numerous layers of ownership until we identify the 
ultimate controlling shareholder: a family, the government, or a widely held corporation.  
Consistent with the ownership literature (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Laeven and Levine, 2008), 
we use 10% as the threshold of voting rights above which the shareholder is assumed to have 
effective control over the intermediate corporations and at the ultimate level.9  A firm is 
classified as widely held if none of its owners has 10% of the voting rights.  This procedure 
yields our final ownership data set that covers 3,056 firms in 22 countries from the period 1996 
to 2008 for which we have available loan contract information from Dealscan and firm financial 
information from Worldscope.  Our final sample of loan deals contains 14,350 syndicated 
loans to these sample firms during the sample period. 
 
2.2. Cash-flow rights and control rights of the largest ultimate owner 
 
We apply the standard methodology in the ownership literature to construct the ultimate 
ownership and control measures using the complete chain of corporate ownership (e.g., 
Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Lin et al., 2011).  
The cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner are calculated as the sum of direct cash-flow rights 
and indirect cash-flow rights.  Direct cash-flow rights are computed based on direct ownership, 
which involves shares held under the shareholder’s name.  Indirect ownership involves shares 
held by entities controlled by the ultimate shareholder.  We compute indirect cash-flow rights 
by multiplying the cash-flow rights along the ownership chain until we reach the ultimate 
                                                              
8 We start our ownership search in OSIRIS and then search Factset and Worldscope if information is not 
available in OSIRIS. 
 
9 Our results are robust to using alternative thresholds, such as 20%. 
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owner of the firm.  Due to the use of pyramid structures, cross-ownership, and dual-class 
shares, control rights can be different from cash-flow rights.  The ultimate owner’s aggregate 
control rights are the sum of direct control rights and indirect control rights.  In the chain of 
control, indirect control rights are measured by the weakest link in the chain of control rights.  
The following simple example illustrates how indirect cash-flow rights and control rights are 
calculated.  Suppose that a family owns fraction a of firm A, which in turn owns fraction b of 
firm B, and that both a and b are greater than the effective control threshold.  Then the 
family’s indirect cash-flow rights in firm B is the product of a and b, the two ownership stakes 
along the chain.  Its indirect control rights in firm B is min(a, b).10   
Following the above procedure, we calculate for each sample firm the cash-flow rights and 
control rights of its largest ultimate owner, defined as the ultimate owner that has the greatest 
aggregate control rights.  We then define the control-ownership wedge as the difference 
between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Laeven 
and Levine, 2008).  This is our key measure to capture the divergence between control rights 
and cash-flow rights.  Our results are robust to using alternative measures such as the ratio of 
control rights to cash-flow rights or a dummy variable that indicates whether control rights 
exceeds cash-flow rights. 
 
2.3. Bank loan syndicate structure   
 
Syndicated loans involve a group of lenders united by a common set of legal documents for 
the purpose of providing funds to a single borrower.11  The syndication process typically starts 
with a borrower awarding the mandate to a lead arranger, who administers and advises the 
                                                              
10 Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) provide and discuss many more complex examples. 
 
11 See Esty (2001, 2003) and Rhodes et al. (2000) for more detailed discussions of the syndication process.  
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syndicate.  The lead arranger analyzes credit quality, and negotiates key terms with the 
borrower before inviting a group of banks to participate, and finally is responsible for allocating 
shares of the loan among the participating banks.  As discussed in the introduction, one way to 
increase the exposure of the lead lender is by having it hold a larger portion of the loan.  
Conceptually, an alternative mechanism for exposing the lead lender is to contractually force 
the lead lender to absorb a higher percentage of any initial losses.  Much as syndicate 
concentration, this internal structured finance dimension of the syndicated loan would provide a 
strong and credible signal of credit quality as well as the commitment by the lead arranger in 
performing due diligence and monitoring.   
However, such a mechanism is not implemented in practice.  Although the lead arranger’s 
due diligence summary is furnished to every participating bank in a memorandum prior to the 
invitation, each participating bank is ultimately responsible for its own assessment of the 
borrower’s credit quality (Esty 2001).  A typical syndicated loan agreement includes extensive 
disclaimers of the lead arranger’s responsibility, and the lead arranger owes no fiduciary duties 
to any participating banks (Ivashina, 2009).  If the borrower defaults, participating banks have 
no recourse against the lead arranger (McCahey, 2003; Wight et al., 2009; Goplan et al., 2010).  
Syndicated loan agreements are typically structured such that no recourse rights are granted to a 
participating lender against the lead lender for non-payment of the loan in order for the control 
of the portion of the loan sold to the participating lender to be considered effectively transferred 
from the lead arranger to the participating lender.  Otherwise, the portion of loan could be 
considered the lead lender’s contingent liability and therefore incur a capital requirement.  
Even implicit agreements between the lead lender and participating lenders for the lead lender 
to absorb initial losses or buy back a participant bank’s portion of the loan in the event of 
default create problems under risk-based capital standards (Martin, 2009).  Consequently, in 
practice, risk sharing in syndicated loans is on a pro rata basis based on each lender’s share in 
the loan (Wight et al., 2009).  In this paper, we therefore focus on syndicate concentration as 
the mechanism for exposing the lead arranger because retaining a large portion of the loan is 
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relatively easy to implement without much complication and at the same time provides a 
credible signal of the lead arranger’s commitment. 
We focus on two aspects of the bank loan syndicate structure: syndicate concentration and 
syndicate composition.  For each loan facility, our proxies for syndicate concentration include 
the total number of lenders, the dollar amount and percentage of the loan kept by the lead 
arranger, and the Herfindahl index based on lenders’ shares (Sufi, 2007).12  We calculate the 
fraction of the loan held by the lead arranger and multiply by 100 to arrive at the percentage 
measure.  If a syndicated loan has more than one lead arranger, we examine the total dollar 
amount and percentage of the loan kept by all the lead arrangers.  Using an alternative 
measure of the average dollar amount and percentage of the loan kept by each lead arranger 
produces robust results.  We define the Herfindahl index as the sum of the squares of each 
lender’ share in the loan.  It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher index values indicating higher 
degrees of concentration of holdings within a syndicate.   
To study syndicate composition, we examine foreign lender participation and syndicate 
industry expertise.  For each loan facility, our proxies for foreign lender participation include 
the total number of foreign lenders and the total percentage of the loan held by all foreign 
lenders combined.  We construct two measures to capture each syndicate’s overall lender 
expertise in the borrower’s industry.  For each lender in a syndicate, we first calculate the total 
amount of loans it has made over the past five years to firms in the same three-digit SIC 
industry as the borrower and then divide this amount by the total amount of loans issued in the 
same industry over the same period by all the lenders in Dealscan.13  A higher ratio from this 
calculation, hereafter referred to as the industry expertise ratio, indicates more accumulated 
experience and expertise of the lender in lending to the borrower’s particular industry.  Our 
first measure of syndicate industry expertise is the sum of the industry expertise ratios of all the 
                                                              
12 Variables requiring information on the amount of loan held by each lender to calculate have fewer 
observations than the concentration variables due to missing data in Dealscan. 
 
13 All our results are robust to using alternative time windows or alternative SIC industry groupings.  
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lenders in the syndicate.  To account for the difference in each lender’s share in the loan, we 
also construct a second measure as the weighted average of the industry expertise ratios of all 
the lenders in the syndicate, with each lender’s share in the loan as its weight. 
 
 
2.4. Control variables  
 
We use a rich set of control variables to capture various characteristics and factors other 
than ownership structure that might influence the loan syndicate structure.  We account for 
borrower firm characteristics including firm size, profitability, leverage, Q, asset tangibility, 
cash-flow volatility, and S&P credit rating. 14   We also control for loan characteristics 
including loan size, loan maturity, loan purpose, whether the facility is a term loan or a revolver, 
and whether the loan includes contingent performance-based pricing.  Another set of control 
variables are macroeconomic factors that capture the economic and financial development as 
well as the sovereign risk at the country level.  These variables include GDP per capita, private 
credit to GDP, and sovereign bond rating.  Finally, we control for country, borrower industry 
and year fixed effects.  
The detailed definitions for these variables as well as all the other variables used in this 
paper are reported in Table 1.  Table 2 presents summary statistics for the entire sample. 




3.1. The effect of the control-ownership divergence on syndicate structure 
 
                                                              
14 S&P ratings are converted to an index from one to seven, with one assigned to the highest AAA rating and 
seven assigned to firms that do not have a credit rating. 
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In this section we investigate the impact of the deviation between the control rights and 
cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm’s largest ultimate owner on its bank loan syndicate 
structure.  We estimate the following empirical model using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions: 
Syndicate structure = f(Control-ownership wedge, Borrower characteristics, Loan  
characteristics, Macroeconomic factors, Country, industry and time effects).     (1) 
In the regressions, each observation represents a single loan.  As explained in the previous 
section, the dependent syndicate structure variables are measures of syndicate concentration and 
syndicate composition.  Our key independent variable of interest is the control-ownership 
wedge, which captures the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the 
borrowing firm’s largest ultimate owner.  We control for the cash-flow rights of the 
borrower’s largest ultimate owner and other borrower characteristics, loan-specific 
characteristics, and country-level macroeconomic factors, as well as country, borrower industry 
and year fixed effects.  All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are 
clustered at the borrowing firm level.    
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 presents the regression results of estimating Eq. (1).  We focus on syndicate 
concentration first, and then examine syndicate composition.  In the first four columns of 
Table 3, the dependent variables are different measures of loan syndicate concentration: the 
total number of lenders (column 1), the dollar amount of the loan kept by the lead arranger 
(column 2), the percentage of the loan kept by the lead arranger (column 3), and the Herfindahl 
index of lenders’ shares in the loan (column 4).  Across all columns, the control-ownership 
wedge is significantly related to the degree of concentration within the syndicate.  Loans to 
borrowing firms with a larger divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the 
largest ultimate owner have a more concentrated syndicate: there are fewer lenders in the 
syndicate, the lead arranger holds a larger amount of the loan both in dollar amount and in 
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percentage of the loan, and the lenders’ shares in the loan overall have a more concentrated 
distribution as indicated by a higher Herfindahl index value.   
The effect of the control rights-cash-flow rights divergence on syndicate concentration is 
not only statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) but also highly significant 
economically. Ceteris paribus, a one-standard-deviation increase in the control-ownership 
wedge reduces the number of lenders in the syndicate by more than 21%, increases the amount 
of the loan held by the lead arranger and the Herfindahl lender share concentration by 
approximately 14% and 17%, respectively, and increases the percentage of the loan held by the 
lead arranger from 57% (at the mean) to 64%.   
Columns 5 through 8 in Table 3 focus on syndicate composition.  We study foreign lender 
participation as well as syndicate industry expertise.  The dependent variables we examine 
include the number of foreign lenders (column 5), the percentage of the loan held by all foreign 
lenders combined (column 6), and the sum and the lender-share-weighted average of the 
industry expertise ratios of all the lenders in the syndicate (columns 7 and 8, respectively).  
Estimates from columns 5 to 8 indicate that corporate ownership structure has a significant 
impact on syndicate composition.  When the borrowing firm’s largest ultimate owner has a 
greater excess of control rights over cash-flow rights, fewer foreign lenders participate in the 
syndicate, and the syndicate is composed of lenders with greater lending experience and 
expertise in the borrower’s industry, relative to the other lenders.  A one-standard-deviation 
increase in the control-ownership wedge reduces the number of foreign lenders in the syndicate 
by approximately 19% and reduces the percentage of the loan held by foreign lenders from 58% 
(at the mean) to 47%, but it increases the total and weighted-average industry expertise of the 
syndicate lenders by 13% and 16%, respectively.  All these effects are also highly significant 
statistically at the 5% level or better. 
Overall, the results from the multivariate regression analyses suggest that the divergence 
between control rights and cash-flow rights of the borrowing firm’s largest ultimate owner has a 
significant impact on the syndicate structure of its bank loans.  In particular, loans to firms 
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with larger control-ownership wedges have more concentrated syndicates with less foreign 
lender participation and more overall lender expertise in the borrower’s industry.  These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the deviation of control rights and cash-flow 
rights in the borrowing firms exacerbates potential tunneling and other agency problems by 
large shareholders, thereby increasing the credit risk faced by lenders.  Consequently, lead 
arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring 
efforts.  These syndicates are relatively concentrated, with the lead arrangers retaining a 
relatively large portion of the loan, and are comprised of domestic banks that are geographically 
close to the borrowing firms and that have relatively more experience in lending to the specific 
industries of the borrowers.15 
 
3.2. Endogeneity of ownership structure 
 
In this section, we address the potential endogeneity concern associated with analyzing the 
effect of corporate ownership structure on loan syndicate structure.  While it is unlikely that a 
borrowing firm determines its ownership structure as a direct function of the syndicate structure 
of its loan, the borrower might have firm-specific characteristics unobservable or unaccounted 
for in our baseline model that jointly determine the control-ownership wedge and the syndicate 
structure.  To alleviate the potential bias in our estimation from omitted variables that affect 
both ownership structure and syndicate structure, we perform two additional tests.  First, we 
include the country×year and industry×year fixed effects to fully capture the omitted country 
and industry characteristics that might affect syndicate structure and test the robustness of the 
                                                              
15 For brevity of presentation, our analyses in the remainder of the paper use the percentage of loan held by 
the lead arranger and the Herfindahl index as measures for syndicate concentration and the percentage of loan held 
by foreign lenders and the weighted-average syndicate industry expertise ratio as measures for syndicate 
composition.  All the results are robust to using the other measures for syndicate concentration and syndicate 
composition as in Table 3. 
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results.  Second, we instrument for the borrowing firm’s ownership structure and perform 
instrumental variables regressions.  
  
3.2.1. Country×year and industry×year fixed effects 
 
In our baseline regressions, we include industry and country dummy variables to control 
for the time-invariant country and industry characteristics that might affect syndicate structure.  
However, it is still possible that there are some time-varying country and industry 
characteristics driving both corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure.  
To fully capture these potential effects and alleviate concerns about the omitted variable bias, 
we test the robustness of our baseline results in Table 4 by adding the country×year (columns 1 
to 4) and industry×year fixed effects (columns 5 to 8) in the regression models.16   
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
As can be seen from Table 4, the regression results with country×year and industry×year 
fixed effects corroborate our baseline findings.  Specifically, the corporate control-ownership 
divergence is positively associated with syndicate concentration and negatively associated with 
foreign lender participation in the syndicate.  Moreover, the corporate control-ownership 
wedge is positively associated with the industry expertise of the syndicate lenders.  All of the 
effects remain statistically significant at the 1% level, with very similar magnitudes as in the 
baseline regressions.  
 
3.2.2. Instrumental variable estimation 
 
                                                              
16 Note that country-specific variables including sovereign risk rating, private credit to GDP, and log GDP 
per capita do not enter into the regressions with country×year fixed effects.   
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Our second approach to address the endogeneity issue is to employ instrumental variables 
estimation.  We instrument for each borrowing firm’s control-ownership wedge and cash-flow 
rights using the initial industry average wedge and the initial industry average cash-flow rights 
in the borrower’s industry as respective instruments (Laeven and Levine, 2009).17  The initial 
industry averages are calculated in the year prior to the start of our sample and are 
country-specific.  As Laeven and Levine (2009) note, an individual firm’s ownership structure 
is correlated with its industry average ownership structure.  However, it is unlikely that the 
average industry ownership structure directly affects the syndicate structure of any particular 
loan of the borrowing firm except through the borrower’s ownership structure.  In the first 
stage regression (untabulated), the coefficients on the instruments are significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level, and the F-test confirms the validity of the instruments.  We present 
the second stage results from the instrumental variables regressions in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The estimates in Table 5 are consistent with our baseline results.  Syndicate concentration 
and industry expertise are positively related to the control-ownership divergence at the 
borrowing firm, and foreign lender participation is negatively related to the divergence.  After 
using instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity concern, the effect of 
corporate ownership structure on bank loan syndicate structure remain strong and significant.  
The coefficients on the control-ownership wedge are larger in absolute magnitude than the 
corresponding coefficients from the OLS regressions and are all statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  While it is impossible to completely solve the endogeneity problem, these test results 
alleviate the concern that endogeneity is likely to account for or bias our results. 
 
3.3. Factors influencing the wedge-syndicate structure relation 
                                                              
17 Laeven and Levine (2009) instrument for a bank’s ownership structure using the average ownership 
structure variables of other banks.   
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In this section, we examine the factors that influence the relation between the 
control-ownership divergence at the borrowing firm and the syndicate structure for the 
borrower’s bank loans.  Our goal is to shed light on the channels through which the tunneling 
and self-dealing risks and the associated monitoring needs induced by the control-ownership 
divergence at the borrowing firm can be exacerbated or mitigated.  Specifically, we study the 
following five sets of factors: the lead arranger’s reputation and lending relationship with the 
borrower, borrowing firm informational opacity, cash-flow rights dispersion across large 
owners, legal rights and institutions, and systemic financial crises.  The intuition is that the 
effect of the control-ownership wedge on syndicate concentration and composition should be 
accentuated (attenuated) by mechanisms that increase (reduce) the credit risk and monitoring 
needs induced by large shareholders’ excess control rights.  Our empirical analyses in this 
section use the percentage of loan held by the lead arranger and the Herfindahl index as 
measures for syndicate concentration.  We use the percentage of loan held by foreign lenders 
and the weighted-average syndicate industry expertise ratio as measures for syndicate 
composition.  All of the results are robust to using the other measures for syndicate 
concentration and syndicate composition as in Table 3.  
 
3.3.1. Lead arranger’s reputation and lending relationship with the borrowing firm 
 
The extant theoretical literature highlights the importance of lender reputation in lending 
behaviors and suggests that banks’ concern with maintaining reputation will mitigate various 
moral hazard problems such as shirking (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).  A good credit 
market reputation takes time to build up, and more reputable banks have more to lose from 
tarnished reputations.  Hence, good reputation can serve as a bonding device that deters highly 
reputable banks from shirking their screening and monitoring responsibilities (Booth and Smith, 
1986; Diamond, 1989; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).  Moreover, the lead arranger’s credit 
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market reputation itself might signal and certify its skill in selecting, managing and monitoring 
the loans it syndicates (Demiroglu and James, 2010b).  Therefore, we expect that the lead 
arranger’s reputation will weaken the link between the control-ownership wedge and the 
syndicate structure.  We test this hypothesis by including the measure for lead arranger 
reputation and its interaction with the control-ownership wedge in the baseline model.  The 
results from this estimation are presented in the columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Our measure for lead arranger reputation is a dummy variable that equals one if the lead 
arranger is ranked as one of the top ten lenders in the syndicated loan market in terms of total 
amount lent for the period from 1996 to 2008.  As the table shows, lead arranger reputation 
exerts a significant impact on syndicate structure.  High lead arranger reputation is associated 
with a decrease in syndicate concentration and syndicate expertise and an increase in foreign 
lender participation.  It is more interesting, however, that the coefficients on the interactive 
terms between wedge and reputation are statistically significant and bear the opposite signs of 
the corresponding coefficients on wedge.  This indicates that the syndicate structure-wedge 
sensitivities are indeed lower for lead arrangers with good reputations.  The effects are both 
statistically and economically significant.  For instance, the coefficients in column 3 imply 
that, for a syndicate with a reputable lead arranger, a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
control-ownership wedge increases the average Herfindahl concentration index by 
approximately 43% less than for a syndicate without a reputable lead arranger. 
The lead arranger’s lending relationship with the borrowing firm might also affect the link 
between the control-ownership wedge and syndicate structure.  In his survey paper, Boot 
(2000) summarizes that a relationship based on repeated lending to the same borrower 
facilitates monitoring in two ways.  A close lending relationship helps overcome the 
information asymmetry and agency problems between the borrower and the lender.  In 
addition, a bank is more willing to incur the cost of gathering borrower-specific information if it 
can be applied to multiple transactions in a long-lasting relationship than if it applies to a single 
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transaction only.  Moreover, its lending relationship with the borrowing firm can signal to the 
participant banks the lead arranger’s ability, experience, cost advantage, and willingness in 
monitoring the borrower.  As a result, we expect that a close lending relationship between the 
borrower and the lead arranger will tend to weaken the link between the control-ownership 
wedge and syndicate structure.   
We test our hypothesis regarding the effect of lending relationships on the syndicate 
structure as follows.  For each loan, we calculate the total amount of loans made by its lead 
arranger to the borrower during the previous five years, divided by the total amount of loans 
made to the borrower by all banks during the previous five years.18  This ratio is our measure 
of the closeness of the lead arranger’s relationship with the borrowing firm.  We re-estimate 
our baseline model including the lead arranger’s lending relationship measure and its 
interaction with the control-ownership wedge.  The results are presented in columns 2, 4, 6, 
and 8 of Table 6. 
Like reputation, the lead arranger’s lending relationship with the borrower not only affects 
syndicate structure directly, but also influences the relation between the wedge and syndicate 
structure.  The coefficients on the interaction terms between lending relationship and 
control-ownership wedge are significant across all specifications and bear the opposite signs of 
the corresponding coefficients on the wedge.  These results are consistent with our expectation 
that the lead arranger’s lending relationship weakens the link between the control-ownership 
wedge and syndicate structure. 
 
3.3.2. Borrowing firm informational opacity 
 
                                                              
18 Our results are robust to using windows other than five years.  If there are multiple lead arrangers in a 
syndicate, the lead arranger’s relationship measure is defined as the maximum relationship measure among all the 
lead arrangers in the syndicate.   
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Informationally opaque firms are more difficult and costly to monitor than are transparent 
firms.  The marginal cost to controlling shareholders of tunneling and self-dealing is lower at 
informationally opaque firms than at transparent firms.  Therefore, the incentive and the 
likelihood for expropriation and other moral hazard activities by large shareholders should be 
greater at opaque firms.  We expect that, as a result, the effect of control-ownership 
divergence on syndicate structure is strengthened in the presence of informational opacity.   
We investigate the effect of borrower informational opacity on the link between the wedge 
and syndicate structure by including informational opacity measures and their interactions with 
the control-ownership wedge in our baseline model.  We use several measures of 
informational opacity: borrower firm size (log assets), the number of analysts covering the 
borrowing firm, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the borrower has a credit 
rating.  In general, large firms with credit ratings and broad analyst coverage would tend to 
have low degrees of informational opacity.  The results of the tests using these measures are 
presented in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The first thing to note from Table 7 is that measures of borrower informational opacity 
largely have significant effects on syndicate structure.  Borrower informational opacity is 
positively related to syndicate concentration and industry expertise and negatively related to 
foreign lender participation.  After controlling for borrowing informational opacity, the effect 
of the control-ownership wedge on syndicate structure remains strong and significant.  
Moreover, the coefficients on the wedge-opacity interaction terms are statistically significant 
across all measures.  Consistent with our baseline results, the control-ownership wedge 
increases the percentage of the loan held by the lead arranger as well as the overall syndicate 
concentration and industry expertise while reducing foreign lender participation in the syndicate.  
The effects of the wedge on syndicate structure are indeed stronger for informationally opaque 
firms than for relatively transparent ones.   
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3.3.3. Borrowing firm cash-flow rights dispersion across large owners 
 
Laeven and Levine (2008) study complex ownership structures and show that cash-flow 
rights dispersion across large owners is negatively related to firm valuation.  In particular, 
their results suggest that the less evenly cash-flow rights are distributed between the largest and 
the second largest owners of the firm, the more difficult is enhanced monitoring.  Under such 
circumstances, it is more likely than otherwise that the controlling shareholder has the incentive 
and the ability to divert corporate resources for private benefits.  Therefore, we expect that the 
sensitivity of syndicate structure to the control-ownership wedge is strengthened by the 
dispersion of cash-flow rights across the borrower’s large owners. 
Following Laeven and Levine (2008), for each firm in our sample we identify whether 
there is a second largest ultimate owner with control rights greater than 10%.  If so, we 
calculate the cash-flow rights of this second largest owner.  We then define the cash-flow 
rights dispersion across large owners as the difference between the cash-flow rights of the 
largest owner and the cash-flow rights of the second largest owner (Laeven and Levine, 
2008).19   
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In Table 8, we report the results of re-estimating our baseline model adding the measure for 
cash-flow rights dispersion and its interaction with the control-ownership wedge as additional 
independent variables.  The results in Table 8 show that, consistent with the predictions of 
Laeven and Levine (2008), the cash-flow rights dispersion between the two largest owners 
increases syndicate concentration and syndicate industry expertise and reduces foreign lender 
participation.  More important, the significant coefficients on the interaction terms bearing the 
same signs as the coefficients on the wedge show that the syndicate concentration and syndicate 
                                                              
19 Following Laeven and Levine (2008), this variable equals zero if the firm does not have two controlling 
shareholders. 
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composition measures are more sensitive to the control-ownership wedge when there is a high 
dispersion between the cash-flow rights of the two largest owners of the borrowing firm.  As 
expected, cash-flow rights dispersion between large owners indeed strengthens the link between 
the wedge and syndicate structure. 
 
3.3.4. Legal rights and institutions  
 
In this section we examine how shareholder rights and credit information sharing systems 
affect the link between the control-ownership wedge and syndicate structure.  Strong 
shareholder rights reduce tunneling and self-dealing incentives and protect minority 
shareholders against expropriation by controlling shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008).  
Information sharing agencies are institutional mechanisms established by creditors to reduce 
asymmetric information in lending.  Information sharing among creditors improves creditors’ 
knowledge of the characteristics and credit histories of borrowers and applicants (Barth et al., 
2009).  Information sharing also works as a post-lending disciplinary device by making it 
more difficult for borrowers with negative histories (e.g., late repayment, default, etc.) to get 
access to credit in the future (Padilla and Pagano, 1997; Houston et al., 2010).  Therefore, the 
relation between the wedge and syndicate structure is likely to be weakened in countries with 
strong shareholder rights and in countries with good credit information sharing systems.   
We use the anti-self-dealing index (Djankov et al., 2008) to proxy for shareholder 
protection from tunneling and self-dealing by controlling shareholders.  This index is 
constructed from survey responses of attorneys regarding a hypothetical self-dealing case.  
These attorneys are affiliated with Lex Mundi law firms in 102 countries.  Each country is 
assigned an index value.  Higher values of the index indicate stronger shareholder protection.  
To proxy for credit information sharing, we use a dummy variable that equals one if an 
information sharing agency operates in the country of the borrower in the observation year and 
zero otherwise (Djankov et al., 2007; Doing Business Database, World Bank).  In Table 9, we 
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report the results for regressions that include the measures for shareholders rights and 
information sharing as well as their respective interactions with the control-ownership wedge.20  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
The results in Table 9 indicate that both shareholder rights and credit information sharing 
are negatively associated with syndicate concentration and syndicate industry expertise.  They 
are positively associated with foreign lender participation.  Also, both have qualitatively 
similar moderating effects on the link between the control-ownership wedge and syndicate 
structure.  This highlights the important role that legal rights and institutions play in protecting 
investors, disciplining the market, and shaping bank lending activities (e.g., Esty and 
Megginson, 2003; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et al. 2010). 
 
3.3.5. Financial crises 
 
In this section, we examine the relationship between corporate ownership structure and 
bank loan syndicate structure during financial crises.  As previous studies suggest, financial 
crises represent relatively exogenous shocks that reduce the return on investment of all firms, 
thereby increasing the difficulty of investor monitoring and lowering the marginal cost of 
insiders’ expropriation activities (Johnson et al., 2000b; Johnson and Mitton, 2003).  We thus 
expect to observe a greater effect of the control-ownership divergence on syndicate structure 
during financial crises than during periods of normal financial market activity.     
We define a dummy variable Financial crisis, which equals one if the country of the 
borrowing firm is undergoing a systemic financial crisis in the observation year.  Financial 
crisis periods are identified in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Banking Crisis 
                                                              
20 We do not include the country fixed effects in these regressions because some of the key independent 
variables in this section (e.g., shareholder rights) are country-specific and time-invariant. 
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Database.21  We add the Financial crisis dummy and its interaction with the control-ownership 
wedge to our baseline model and present the estimation results in Table 10.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 The estimates from Table 10 show that loan syndicates during financial crises are more 
concentrated, composed of fewer foreign lenders and of lenders with greater industry lending 
expertise than are syndicates during periods of normal financial market activity.  More 
important, the coefficients on the interaction terms between the wedge and the crisis dummy 
indicate that the wedge-syndicate structure sensitivities increase during crisis times.  
Borrowing firm ownership structure affects the concentration and composition of loan 
syndicates even during normal times.  The estimated coefficients on the wedge variable are 
statistically significant across all specifications.  The effects, however, are amplified for the 




In this paper, we explore how ownership structures of borrowing firms influence the 
financing arrangements for their syndicated loans.  Using a novel data set comprised of 
borrowing firms across 22 countries from 1996 to 2008, we find strong evidence that the 
divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of a 
borrowing firm significantly affects the structure of its syndicated loans.  When large 
shareholders of a borrowing firm have control rights that exceed their cash-flow rights, lenders 
concentrate the loan syndicate and the lead arranger retains a relatively large portion of the loan.  
Moreover, the syndicate tends to be comprised of lenders with more lending expertise related to 
the borrowing firm’s industry and of domestic lenders that are geographically close to the 
                                                              
21 The Banking Crisis Database provides a comprehensive coverage of systemic banking and financial crisis 
episodes in 93 countries from 1972 to 2008 (Honohan and Laeven, 2005).  
 
          27 
 
borrowing firm.  Further analyses indicate that the effect of the control-ownership wedge on 
syndicate concentration and composition is particularly pronounced for firms that are 
informationally opaque, firms that have a high dispersion of cash-flow rights across large 
owners, and firms in countries undergoing financial crises.  On the other hand, the relation 
between the control-ownership divergence and loan syndicate structure is weakened if the lead 
arranger has a favorable reputation and a close lending relationship with the borrowing firm.  
This relation is also weakened by strong legal protection for shareholders and the presence of 
good credit information sharing systems.  These results contribute to our understanding of how 
the self-dealing activities and the associated credit risk induced by the control-ownership 
divergence can be mitigated and how lending institutions structure financing arrangements 
when effective monitoring is most important.
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Table 1  Definitions of variables   
 
This table provides detailed definitions for all the variables used in the paper. 
   
Variable names Variable definitions 
Syndicate concentration  
Total number of lenders The total number of lenders in the syndicate 
Amount of loan kept by lead 
arranger 
The dollar amount of the loan kept by the lead arranger.  If the syndicate has more than 
one lead arranger, this is the total amount of the loan kept by all the lead arrangers.    
Percentage of loan kept by 
lead arranger  
The percentage of the loan kept by the lead arranger.  If the syndicate has more than 
one lead arranger, this is the total percentage of the loan kept by all the lead arrangers. 
Herfindahl index of lenders’ 
shares 
The Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares in the loan, computed as the sum of the squares
of each lender’ share in the loan 
Syndicate composition  
Number of foreign lenders The total number of foreign lenders in the syndicate 
Percentage of loan held by 
foreign lenders  
The total percentage of the loan held by all foreign lenders 
Total syndicate industry 
expertise 
The sum of the industry expertise ratios of all the lenders in the syndicate.  The 
industry experience ratio of a lender is defined as the total amount of loans it has made 
over the past five years in the three-digit SIC industry that the borrower belongs to, 
divided by the total amount of loans issued in the same industry over the same period by 
all the lenders in Dealscan.  
Average syndicate industry 
expertise 
The weighted average of the industry expertise ratios of all the lenders in the syndicate, 
with each lender’s share in the loan as its weight.  The industry experience ratio of a 
lender is defined as the total amount of loans it has made over the past five years in the 
three-digit SIC industry that the borrower belongs to, divided by the total amount of 
loans issued in the same industry over the same period by all the lenders in Dealscan.  
  
Borrower ownership  
Control-ownership wedge The difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate 
owner of the firm 
Cash-flow rights The cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm 
Cash-flow rights dispersion 
across large owners 
The difference between the cash-flow rights of the largest owner and the cash-flow 
rights of the second largest owner (Laeven and Levine, 2008) 
  
Borrower characteristics  
Leverage  The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets  
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment, divided by total assets 
Log assets The natural log of total assets measured in millions of US dollars 
Profitability  Net income, divided by total assets 
Cash-flow volatility The standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from operations over the four fiscal 
years prior to the loan initiation year, scaled by the sum of long-term debt and debt in 
current liabilities 
S&P rating The S&P firm credit rating, converted to an index from one to seven as follows: 1 = 
Aaa, 2 = Aa, 3 = A, 4 = Bbb, 5 = Bb, 6 = B or worse, and 7 = no rating 
No rating dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the firm does not have an S&P credit rating and 
zero otherwise 
Q The sum of market value of equity plus the book value of debt, divided by total assets. 
Market value of equity equals price per share times total number of shares outstanding. 
Book value of debt equals total assets minus book value of equity. 
Number of analysts The total number of stock analysts covering the firm 
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Table 1  Definitions of variables  
(Continued) 
   
Variable names Variable definitions 
Loan characteristics  
Performance pricing dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the loan uses performance pricing and zero 
otherwise 
Term loan dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the loan is a term loan and zero otherwise 
Log loan size  The natural log of the loan amount measured in millions of US dollars 
Log loan maturity The natural log of the loan maturity measured in days 
Loan purpose dummies Dummy variables for loan purposes, including acquisitions, backup line, capital 
expenditure, corporate purposes, refinancing, working capital, and others  
Lead arranger characteristics  
Top ten lender A dummy variable that equals one if the lead arranger is ranked as one of the top ten 
lenders in the syndicated loan market in terms of amount lent for the period from 1996 to 
2008 and zero otherwise 
Lending relationship with 
borrower 
The amount of loans the lead arranger has made to the borrower in the previous five 
years, divided by the total amount of loans made to the borrower by all banks in the 
previous five years 
Macroeconomic factors  
Sovereign risk rating Moody’s rating on the long-term sovereign (government) bonds for the borrower’s 
country (denominated in US dollars), converted into an index from one to six as follows: 
1 = Aaa, 2 = Aa, 3 = A, 4 = Bbb, 5 = Bb, and 6 = B or worse 
Private credit to GDP The private credit by commercial banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP
Log GDP per capita The natural log of the real GDP per capita in US dollars (USD) 
Anti-self-dealing An index constructed based on the survey of a hypothetical self-dealing case among 
attorneys from Lex Mundi law firms in 102 countries (Djankov et al., 2008).  Higher 
values of the index indicate stronger shareholder protection against self-dealing by 
controlling shareholders. 
Credit information sharing A dummy variable that equals one if an information sharing agency operates in the 
country of the borrower in the observation year and zero otherwise (Djankov et al., 2007)
Financial crisis A dummy variable that equals one if the country of the borrower is undergoing a 
financial crisis in the observation year and zero otherwise, as identified in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Banking Crisis Database 
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Table 2  Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation (STD), and number of observations (N) for all the variables 
used in the paper.  Definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
Variable names Mean STD N 
Syndicate concentration 
Total number of lenders 7.974 8.514 14,350 
Amount of loan kept by lead arranger ($MM)  138.871 241.724 8,282 
Percentage of loan kept by lead arranger (%) 57.282 35.919 8,282 
Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares 0.257 0.200 8,282 
Syndicate composition 
Number of foreign lenders 4.756 6.765 14,350 
Percentage of loan kept by foreign lenders (%) 58.235 43.265 8,282 
Total syndicate industry expertise (%) 1.622 7.138 14,350 
Average syndicate industry expertise (%) 0.564 3.146 8,282 
Borrower ownership 
Control-ownership wedge 0.064 0.111 14,350 
Cash-flow rights 0.270 0.252 14,350 
Cash-flow rights dispersion between large owners 0.178 0.171 14,350 
Borrower characteristics 
Leverage 0.333 0.293 14,350 
Tangibility 0.326 0.271 14,350 
Total assets ($MM) 4665 20711 14,350 
Profitability 0.090 0.078 14,350 
Cash-flow volatility 0.735 1.056 14,350 
S&P rating 1.590 0.976 14,350 
No rating dummy 0.277 0.448 14,350 
Q 1.264 0.472 14,350 
Number of analysts 11.787 11.106 14,350 
Loan characteristics 
Performance pricing dummy 0.059 0.235 14,350 
Term loan dummy 0.467 0.499 14,350 
Loan size ($MM) 362 1095 14,350 
Loan maturity (days) 1582 1042 14,350 
Lead arranger characteristics 
Top 10 lender 0.570 0.495 14,350 
Lending relationship with the borrower (%) 13.703 25.698 14,350 
Macroeconomic factors 
Sovereign risk rating 1.692 0.854 14,350 
Private credit to GDP 1.300 0.821 14,350 
GDP per capita 22689 10229 14,350 
Anti-self-dealing 0.618 0.255 14,350 
Credit information sharing 0.912 0.283 14,350 
Financial crisis 0.231 0.422 14,350 
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Table 3  The effect of the control-ownership wedge on syndicate structure 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect of the control-ownership wedge on syndicate structure.  The dependent variables are the total number of lenders 
(column 1), the dollar amount of the loan held by the lead arranger (column 2), the percentage of the loan held by the lead arranger (column 3), the Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares 
in the loan (column 4), the number of foreign lenders (column 5), the percentage of the loan held by all foreign lenders (column 6), the total syndicate industry expertise (column 7), 
and the average syndicate industry expertise (column 8).  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest 
ultimate owner of the firm.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
                           
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Syndicate Concentration  Syndicate Composition 
  Total number 
of lenders 
Amount of loan 
held by lead 
arranger ($MM)  
Percentage of 
loan held by lead 
arrangers (%) 
Herfindahl index 
of lenders' shares 
 Number of 
foreign lenders 
Percentage of loan 








Control-ownership wedge -15.267 173.565 63.225 0.401  -8.184 -99.121 1.930 0.826 
[0.026]** [0.023]** [0.008]*** [0.007]***  [0.016]** [0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.003]*** 
Cash-flow rights 2.419 -45.038 -17.361 -0.095  1.526 16.776 -0.822 -0.291 
[0.015]** [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.022]**  [0.073]* [0.024]** [0.012]** [0.283] 
Leverage -4.648 40.875 22.266 0.075  -3.249 -31.465 0.981 0.288 
[0.409] [0.486] [0.071]* [0.374]  [0.366] [0.053]* [0.316] [0.452] 
Tangibility 2.215 -36.322 -14.589 -0.041  1.148 11.423 -0.339 -0.119 
[0.092]* [0.011]** [0.176] [0.032]**  [0.148] [0.014]** [0.022]** [0.345] 
Log assets 0.053 -2.539 -0.819 -0.003  0.034 0.489 -0.037 -0.054 
[0.032]** [0.012]** [0.022]** [0.154]  [0.075]* [0.081]* [0.032]** [0.033]** 
Profitability 5.228 -229.533 -104.451 -0.563  1.457 18.137 -2.572 -1.215 
[0.254] [0.146] [0.046]** [0.043]**  [0.247] [0.062]* [0.246] [0.264] 
Cash-flow volatility -0.240 5.385 2.323 0.009  -0.040 -0.223 0.043 0.024 
[0.012]** [0.394] [0.124] [0.021]**  [0.032]** [0.053]* [0.033]** [0.120] 
S&P rating -0.124 19.373 7.167 0.028  -0.159 -2.192 0.229 0.078 
[0.033]** [0.022]** [0.031]** [0.069]*  [0.044]** [0.024]** [0.023]** [0.012]** 
 
 (Continued on the next page) 
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Table 3  The effect of the control-ownership wedge on syndicate structure 
(Continued) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Syndicate Concentration  Syndicate Composition 
  Total number 
of lenders 
Amount of loan 
held by lead 
arranger ($MM)  
Percentage of 
loan held by lead 
arrangers (%) 
Herfindahl index 
of lenders' shares 
 Number of 
foreign lenders 
Percentage of loan 








No rating dummy -1.059 21.763 6.358 0.031  -1.428 -15.397 0.267 0.108 
[0.033]** [0.155] [0.089]* [0.020]**  [0.031]** [0.033]** [0.023]** [0.014]** 
Q 0.735 -21.063 -3.641 -0.018  0.189 1.593 0.226 0.098 
[0.184] [0.443] [0.179] [0.439]  [0.146] [0.544] [0.461] [0.144] 
Performance pricing dummy 1.630 -12.820 -5.315 -0.024  1.080 11.886 -0.261 -0.083 
[0.014]** [0.276] [0.012]** [0.075]*  [0.012]** [0.035]** [0.012]** [0.060]* 
Term loan dummy -1.891 32.072 13.883 0.054  -1.163 -7.621 0.340 0.114 
[0.129] [0.269] [0.128] [0.031]**  [0.030]** [0.227] [0.062]* [0.012]** 
Log loan size 2.213 -14.891 -4.908 -0.024  0.739 8.501 0.136 0.056 
[0.031]** [0.059]* [0.023]** [0.020]**  [0.031]** [0.068]* [0.026]** [0.166] 
Log loan maturity 1.307 -28.369 -11.939 -0.053  -0.524 -7.080 0.313 0.137 
[0.041]** [0.039]** [0.012]** [0.074]*  [0.012]** [0.054]* [0.020]** [0.032]** 
Sovereign risk rating -1.222 19.940 11.863 0.035  -0.981 -12.877 0.247 0.082 
[0.063]* [0.161] [0.065]* [0.407]  [0.136] [0.186] [0.156] [0.140] 
Private credit to GDP 1.144 -11.684 -4.530 -0.021  1.304 16.786 0.256 0.079 
[0.023]** [0.137] [0.075]* [0.056]*  [0.019]** [0.175] [0.016]** [0.012]** 
Log GDP per capita 1.970 -31.947 -15.184 -0.048  0.219 2.908 -0.304 -0.086 
[0.070]* [0.530] [0.078]* [0.271]  [0.389] [0.252] [0.464] [0.127] 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 14,350 8,282 8,282 8,282  14,350 8,282 14,350 8,282 
Number of firms 3,056 2,167 2,167 2,167  3,056 2,167 3,056 2,167 
Adjusted R2 0.424 0.252 0.351 0.156  0.425 0.458 0.161 0.187 
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Table 4  Robustness: Country×year and industry×year fixed effects 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect of the control-ownership wedge on syndicate structure, with country×year (columns 1 to 4) and industry×year fixed effects 
(columns 5 to 8) added in the regression models.  The dependent variables are the percentage of loan held by the lead arranger (columns 1 and 5), the Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares in 
the loan (columns 2 and 6), the percentage of loan held by all foreign lenders (columns 3 and 7), and the average syndicate industry expertise (columns 4 and 8).  The control-ownership 
wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  
P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Country×Year Fixed Effects   Industry×Year Fixed Effects 
  Syndicate Concentration Syndicate Composition  Syndicate Concentration Syndicate Composition 
  Percentage of loan 
held by lead 
arrangers (%) 
Herfindahl index 
of lenders' shares 
Percentage of loan 





 Percentage of 
loan held by lead 
arrangers (%) 
Herfindahl index 
of lenders' shares 
Percentage of loan 





Control-ownership wedge 62.401 0.357 -94.176 0.742  61.791 0.307 -89.218 0.714 
[0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.003]***  [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.004]*** 
Cash-flow rights -16.981 -0.093 16.156 -0.280  -16.314 -0.090 15.740 -0.272 
[0.022]** [0.023]** [0.025]** [0.288]  [0.024]** [0.026]** [0.028]** [0.320] 
Leverage 21.952 0.078 -30.812 0.283  22.718 0.071 -30.440 0.300 
[0.074]* [0.363] [0.054]* [0.463]  [0.069]* [0.384] [0.055]* [0.464] 
Tangibility -14.308 -0.042 11.162 -0.116  -14.159 -0.041 11.718 -0.113 
[0.181] [0.031]** [0.015]** [0.354]  [0.180] [0.033]** [0.014]** [0.349] 
Log assets -0.832 -0.003 0.504 -0.055  -0.841 -0.003 0.474 -0.056 
[0.021]** [0.152] [0.079]* [0.032]**  [0.022]** [0.149] [0.082]* [0.031]** 
Profitability -99.205 -0.585 17.369 -1.167  -102.034 -0.548 17.310 -1.232 
[0.047]** [0.042]** [0.064]* [0.273]  [0.047]** [0.044]** [0.063]* [0.256] 
Cash-flow volatility 2.372 0.009 -0.218 0.023  2.390 0.010 -0.215 0.025 
[0.122] [0.022]** [0.054]* [0.114]  [0.120] [0.020]** [0.054]* [0.117] 
S&P rating 7.431 0.028 -2.133 0.080  6.956 0.026 -2.138 0.076 
[0.030]** [0.066]* [0.025]** [0.011]**  [0.032]** [0.071]* [0.027]** [0.015]** 
No rating dummy 6.585 0.031 -15.782 0.105  6.254 0.030 -15.733 0.112 
[0.086]* [0.019]** [0.032]** [0.014]**  [0.092]* [0.021]** [0.032]** [0.013]** 
Q -3.744 -0.019 1.571 0.093  -3.542 -0.019 1.642 0.101 
[0.174] [0.425] [0.562] [0.150]  [0.183] [0.425] [0.531] [0.152] 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Table 4  Robustness: Country×year and industry×year fixed effects 
(Continued) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Interactions of country effects and time effects   Interactions of industry effects and time effects 
  Syndicate Concentration Syndicate Composition  Syndicate Concentration Syndicate Composition 
  Percentage of loan 
held by lead 
arrangers (%) 
Herfindahl index 
of lenders' shares 
Percentage of loan 





 Percentage of 
loan held by lead 
arrangers (%) 
Herfindahl index 
of lenders' shares 
Percentage of loan 





Performance pricing dummy -5.055 -0.025 11.460 -0.085  -5.134 -0.025 12.087 -0.086 
[0.012]** [0.074]* [0.036]** [0.061]*  [0.012]** [0.072]* [0.036]** [0.058]* 
Term loan dummy 13.355 0.053 -7.434 0.108  13.714 0.051 -7.479 0.111 
[0.125] [0.030]** [0.232] [0.012]**  [0.126] [0.032]** [0.232] [0.012]** 
Log loan size -4.747 -0.025 8.395 0.054  -4.688 -0.025 8.611 0.055 
[0.022]** [0.019]** [0.066]* [0.168]  [0.022]** [0.020]** [0.066]* [0.170] 
Log loan maturity -12.379 -0.054 -6.765 0.142  -11.382 -0.052 -7.241 0.139 
[0.012]** [0.071]* [0.055]* [0.030]**  [0.012]** [0.072]* [0.053]* [0.031]** 
Sovereign risk rating      12.337 0.036 -13.035 0.080 
     [0.065]* [0.394] [0.184] [0.144] 
Private credit to GDP      -4.601 -0.022 16.161 0.081 
     [0.073]* [0.054]* [0.182] [0.012]** 
Log GDP per capita      -15.687 -0.049 2.823 -0.083 
      [0.075]* [0.279] [0.261] [0.131] 
          
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects x time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  − − − − 
Country effects − − − −  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects x time effects − − − −  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  − − − − 
Number of observations 14,350 8,282 8,282 8,282  14,350 8,282 14,350 8,282 
Number of firms 3,056 2,167 2,167 2,167  3,056 2,167 3,056 2,167 
Adjusted R2 0.415 0.202 0.519 0.288  0.421 0.227 0.513 0.235 
 






Table 5  Instrumental variables estimation 
 
This table presents the results of instrumental variables estimations of the effect of the 
control-ownership wedge on syndicate structure.  The dependent variables are the percentage of loan held 
by the lead arranger (column 1), the Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares in the loan (column 2), the 
percentage of loan held by all foreign lenders (column 3), and the average syndicate industry expertise 
(column 4).  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and 
cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  The instruments for the control-ownership wedge 
and cash-flow rights are the initial industry average wedge and the initial industry average cash-flow rights, 
respectively.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
               
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Syndicate Concentration  Syndicate Composition 
 
Percentage of loan 





 Percentage of loan 





Control-ownership wedge 106.594 0.597  -138.738 1.217 
[0.004]*** [0.000]***  [0.005]*** [0.003]*** 
Cash-flow rights -37.998 -0.267  28.639 -0.302 
[0.023]** [0.003]***  [0.011]** [0.094]* 
Leverage 19.163 0.070  -17.696 0.186 
[0.043]** [0.693]  [0.083]* [0.422] 
Tangibility -12.230 -0.038  22.900 -0.131 
[0.020]** [0.159]  [0.016]** [0.240] 
Log assets -0.658 -0.003  0.766 -0.016 
[0.128] [0.014]**  [0.071]* [0.218] 
Profitability -93.518 -0.410  12.590 -1.054 
[0.017]** [0.022]**  [0.064]* [0.252] 
Cash-flow volatility 2.390 0.007  -0.271 0.025 
[0.017]** [0.168]  [0.069]* [0.146] 
S&P rating 6.361 0.021  -1.723 0.093 
[0.064]* [0.084]*  [0.127] [0.030]** 
No rating dummy 4.271 0.020  -26.160 0.138 
[0.022]** [0.032]**  [0.021]** [0.089]* 
Q -2.950 -0.022  2.605 0.059 
[0.164] [0.072]*  [0.425] [0.644] 
Performance pricing dummy -4.431 -0.022  9.849 -0.110 
[0.012]** [0.090]*  [0.060]* [0.276] 
Term loan dummy 14.500 0.052  -10.448 0.071 
[0.029]** [0.024]**  [0.189] [0.157] 
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(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Syndicate Concentration  Syndicate Composition 
 
Percentage of loan 





 Percentage of loan 





Log loan size -4.650 -0.027  7.995 0.056 
[0.014]** [0.021]**  [0.062]* [0.154] 
Log loan maturity 10.806 -0.057  -10.089 0.146 
[0.053]* [0.023]**  [0.166] [0.012]** 
Sovereign risk rating 12.389 0.034  -10.767 0.068 
[0.085]* [0.300]  [0.254] [0.165] 
Private credit to GDP -4.857 -0.022  25.304 0.068 
[0.064]* [0.305]  [0.117] [0.185] 
Log GDP per capita -15.700 -0.044  0.953 -0.080 
[0.272] [0.380]  [0.387] [0.148] 
 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,282 8,282  8,282 8,282 
Number of firms 2,167 2,167  2,167 2,167 




          41 
 
 
Table 6  Lead arranger’s reputation and lending relationship with the borrowing firm 
 
This table presents regression results on the effect of the lead arranger’s reputation and lending relationship with the borrowing firm 
on the relation between the control-ownership wedge and syndicate structure.  The dependent variables are the percentage of loan held 
by the lead arranger (columns 1 and 2), the Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares in the loan (columns 3 and 4), the percentage of loan held 
by all foreign lenders (columns 5 and 6), and the average syndicate industry expertise (columns 7 and 8).  The control-ownership 
wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Top ten 
lender is a dummy variable that equals one if the lead arranger is ranked as one of the top ten lenders in the syndicated loan market for 
the period from 1996 to 2008.  Lending relationship is defined as the amount of loans the lead arranger has made to the borrower 
during the previous five years, divided by the total amount of loans made to the borrower by all banks during the previous five years.  
Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in 
brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
                            
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Syndicate Concentration Syndicate Composition 
 
Percentage of loan held 
by lead arranger (%) 
Herfindahl index of 
lenders’ shares  
Percentage of loan held 
by foreign lenders (%) 
Average syndicate 
industry expertise (%) 
Control-ownership wedge 79.671 78.728 0.386 0.320 -76.613 -79.312 0.848 0.858 
[0.004]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.032]** [0.022]** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Top 10 lender -7.203 -0.020 14.172 -0.094 
[0.003]*** [0.012]** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
Top 10 lender x Wedge -32.844 -0.168 36.597 -0.532 
[0.023]** [0.024]** [0.000]*** [0.016]** 
Lending relationship -0.160 -0.001 0.286 -0.002 
[0.024]** [0.012]** [0.025]** [0.012]** 
Lending relationship x Wedge -3.586 -0.012 2.419 -0.037 
[0.012]** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.024]** 
Cash-flow rights -11.041 -16.548 -0.202 -0.147 14.186 16.880 -0.454 -0.261 
[0.036]** [0.031]** [0.022]** [0.023]** [0.033]** [0.022]** [0.136] [0.076]* 
Leverage 33.508 23.498 0.061 0.071 -24.107 -29.947 0.365 0.289 
[0.052]* [0.068]* [0.414] [0.388] [0.217] [0.053]* [0.316] [0.448] 
Tangibility -9.361 -13.194 -0.041 -0.042 11.942 12.429 -0.161 -0.126 
[0.196] [0.174] [0.033]** [0.031]** [0.012]** [0.015]** [0.314] [0.324] 
Log assets -0.945 -0.851 -0.003 -0.003 0.545 0.467 -0.012 -0.010 
[0.021]** [0.021]** [0.156] [0.036]** [0.069]* [0.088]* [0.026]** [0.024]** 
Profitability -85.016 -99.734 -0.593 -0.559 13.009 18.946 -2.390 -1.284 
[0.079]* [0.057]* [0.039]** [0.155] [0.149] [0.054]* [0.173] [0.241] 
Cash-flow volatility 2.255 2.245 0.007 0.009 -0.193 -0.245 0.026 0.028 
[0.144] [0.139] [0.205] [0.020]** [0.052]* [0.056]* [0.140] [0.129] 
S&P rating 10.218 7.263 0.030 0.027 -1.590 -2.401 0.093 0.106 
[0.019]** [0.023]** [0.070]* [0.079]* [0.029]** [0.024]** [0.012]** [0.016]** 
No rating dummy 5.180 6.084 0.035 0.028 -29.502 -15.222 0.105 0.115 
[0.109] [0.110] [0.025]** [0.029]** [0.021]** [0.036]** [0.011]** [0.017]** 
 








Table 6  Lead arranger’s reputation and lending relationship with the borrowing firm 
(Continued) 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Syndicate Concentration Syndicate Composition 
 
Percentage of loan held 
by lead arranger (%) 
Herfindahl index of 
lenders’ shares  
Percentage of loan held 
by foreign lenders (%) 
Average syndicate 
industry expertise (%) 
Q -4.989 -3.692 -0.021 -0.017 2.720 1.534 0.252 0.160 
[0.125] [0.065]* [0.407] [0.483] [0.258] [0.551] [0.128] [0.138] 
Performance pricing dummy -5.004 -5.361 -0.018 -0.025 7.359 9.910 -0.339 -0.187 
[0.070]* [0.013]** [0.070]* [0.072]* [0.137] [0.033]** [0.021]** [0.059]* 
Term loan dummy 13.905 14.748 0.054 0.054 -7.291 -7.188 0.110 0.109 
[0.137] [0.127] [0.030]** [0.031]** [0.237] [0.227] [0.013]** [0.019]** 
Log loan size -4.237 -5.020 -0.020 -0.026 4.566 7.804 0.099 0.052 
[0.025]** [0.021]** [0.031]** [0.012]** [0.080]* [0.079]* [0.085]* [0.167] 
Log loan maturity -9.725 -11.378 -0.054 -0.053 -6.617 -7.444 0.132 0.136 
[0.026]** [0.011]** [0.063]* [0.073]* [0.086]* [0.058]* [0.031]** [0.030]** 
Sovereign risk rating 14.836 12.329 0.031 0.033 -8.087 -11.842 0.074 0.084 
[0.023]** [0.064]* [0.906] [0.421] [0.318] [0.192] [0.211] [0.145] 
Private credit to GDP -6.840 -5.072 -0.010 -0.017 9.311 13.774 0.083 0.070 
[0.023]** [0.073]* [0.396] [0.051]* [0.257] [0.174] [0.085]* [0.012]** 
Log GDP per capita -16.729 -14.182 -0.044 -0.046 2.239 2.851 -0.079 -0.089 
[0.270] [0.079]* [0.366] [0.279] [0.431] [0.264] [0.164] [0.128] 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 
Number of firms 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 
Adjusted R2 0.359 0.351 0.156 0.157 0.473 0.459 0.226 0.213 
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Table 7  Borrowing firm informational opacity  
 
This table presents regression results on the effect of borrowing firm informational opacity on the relation between the control-ownership wedge and syndicate structure.  The 
dependent variables are the percentage of loan held by the lead arranger (columns 1, 2, and 3), the Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares in the loan (columns 4, 5, and 6), the percentage of 
loan held by all foreign lenders (columns 7, 8, and 9), and the average syndicate industry expertise (columns 10, 11, and 12).  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference 
between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  No rating dummy equals one if the firm does not have an S&P credit rating.  Number of analysts 
is the total number of stock analysts covering the firm.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are 
reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Syndicate Concentration Syndicate Composition 
  
Percentage of loan  
held by lead arranger (%) 
Herfindahl index  
of lenders’ shares 
  
Percentage of loan  
held by foreign lenders (%) 
Average syndicate 
 industry expertise (%) 
Control-ownership wedge 90.624 115.302 102.705  0.507 0.543 0.350 -108.222 -71.747 -117.343 0.674 0.557 0.753 
[0.001]*** [0.004]*** [0.007]***  [0.005]*** [0.004]*** [0.012]** [0.014]** [0.028]** [0.019]** [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.002]*** 
Log assets x Wedge -18.663  -0.080 23.243 -0.117 
[0.022]**  [0.027]** [0.022]** [0.034]** 
No rating dummy x Wedge 61.589  0.297 -41.976 0.634 
[0.023]**  [0.028]** [0.025]** [0.024]** 
Number of analysts x Wedge -3.017  -0.015 5.032 -0.036 
[0.035]**  [0.027]** [0.024]** [0.015]** 
Number of analysts -0.431  -0.002 0.523 -0.005 
[0.020]**  [0.017]** [0.017]** [0.024]** 
Log assets -0.559 -0.825 -0.891  -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.682 0.558 0.983 -0.017 -0.013 -0.012 
[0.032]** [0.024]** [0.012]**  [0.237] [0.145] [0.123] [0.032]** [0.084]* [0.033]** [0.021]** [0.024]** [0.013]** 
No rating dummy 5.951 5.493 6.130  0.028 0.037 0.033 -12.602 -19.675 -11.698 0.102 0.101 0.098 
[0.095]* [0.147] [0.084]*  [0.024]** [0.023]** [0.022]** [0.033]** [0.021]** [0.034]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.023]** 
Cash-flow rights -14.590 -14.634 -20.444  -0.081 -0.076 -0.113 17.226 16.731 17.139 -0.348 -0.233 -0.415 
[0.033]** [0.022]** [0.024]**  [0.023]** [0.023]** [0.021]** [0.012]** [0.032]** [0.064]* [0.265] [0.302] [0.258] 
Leverage 20.740 22.046 15.925  0.062 0.063 0.086 -30.491 -31.631 -19.251 0.299 0.293 0.459 
[0.083]* [0.069]* [0.261]  [0.376] [0.381] [0.303] [0.052]* [0.053]* [0.251] [0.445] [0.453] [0.280] 
Tangibility -9.006 -14.418 -16.073  -0.044 -0.041 -0.035 11.317 11.437 13.604 -0.117 -0.116 -0.216 
[0.189] [0.174] [0.091]*  [0.024]** [0.032]** [0.051]* [0.062]* [0.059]* [0.015]** [0.348] [0.356] [0.070]* 
 
(Continued on the next page) 




Table 7  Borrowing firm informational opacity  
(Continued) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Syndicate Concentration Syndicate Composition 
  
Percentage of loan  
held by lead arranger (%) 
Herfindahl index  
of lenders’ shares 
 
Percentage of loan  
held by foreign lenders (%) 
Average syndicate 
 industry expertise (%) 
Profitability -107.953 -105.332 -132.603 -0.567 -0.555 -0.651 18.080 17.825 12.443 -1.250 -1.229 -2.214 
[0.051]* [0.049]** [0.012]** [0.053]* [0.046]** [0.024]** [0.064]* [0.055]* [0.211] [0.262] [0.254] [0.170] 
Cash-flow volatility 2.390 2.406 2.866 0.008 0.008 0.006 -0.199 -0.233 -0.187 0.015 0.021 0.015 
[0.123] [0.134] [0.063]* [0.019]** [0.023]** [0.031]** [0.060]* [0.031]** [0.080]* [0.121] [0.130] [0.128] 
S&P rating 6.510 7.338 9.946 0.027 0.031 0.043 -2.215 -2.231 -1.856 0.103 0.088 0.107 
[0.022]** [0.037]** [0.012]** [0.070]* [0.068]* [0.061]* [0.017]** [0.018]** [0.025]** [0.012]** [0.018]** [0.015]** 
Q -3.321 -3.816 -3.770 -0.018 -0.016 -0.018 1.537 1.559 1.480 0.086 0.089 0.066 
[0.174] [0.175] [0.167] [0.452] [0.431] [0.448] [0.549] [0.549] [0.559] [0.150] [0.150] [0.155] 
Performance pricing dummy -5.288 -5.312 -4.357 -0.024 -0.028 -0.019 12.028 11.793 10.760 -0.074 -0.111 -0.166 
[0.011]** [0.011]** [0.051]* [0.075]* [0.064]* [0.079]* [0.027]** [0.032]** [0.072]* [0.070]* [0.061]* [0.058]* 
Term loan dummy 14.081 14.026 13.574 0.052 0.053 0.050 -7.716 -7.701 -12.449 0.112 0.119 0.085 
[0.139] [0.135] [0.126] [0.021]** [0.031]** [0.030]** [0.213] [0.217] [0.031]** [0.012]** [0.020]** [0.231] 
Log loan size -4.917 -4.928 -5.164 -0.024 -0.024 -0.017 8.527 8.657 7.225 0.053 0.044 0.076 
[0.020]** [0.023]** [0.012]** [0.017]** [0.025]** [0.057]* [0.068]* [0.061]* [0.281] [0.166] [0.164] [0.164] 
Log loan maturity -12.223 -11.746 -12.057 -0.056 -0.054 -0.054 -7.185 -7.204 -7.311 0.128 0.138 0.128 
[0.018]** [0.012]** [0.017]** [0.064]* [0.074]* [0.072]* [0.068]* [0.060]* [0.060]* [0.031]** [0.039]** [0.031]** 
Sovereign risk rating 11.900 12.117 11.215 0.039 0.052 0.061 -18.622 -12.021 -21.444 0.083 0.091 0.086 
[0.065]* [0.064]* [0.061]* [0.394] [0.380] [0.178] [0.179] [0.182] [0.080]* [0.128] [0.141] [0.109] 
Private credit to GDP -4.564 -4.557 -3.469 -0.022 -0.022 -0.038 18.489 16.420 20.085 0.081 0.069 0.071 
[0.084]* [0.075]* [0.492] [0.056]* [0.053]* [0.027]** [0.179] [0.178] [0.079]* [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.015]** 
Log GDP per capita -15.303 -15.293 -13.860 -0.058 -0.064 -0.072 2.772 2.998 1.854 -0.078 -0.073 -0.074 
[0.069]* [0.067]* [0.079]* [0.259] [0.258] [0.146] [0.270] [0.258] [0.580] [0.128] [0.127] [0.116] 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 
Number of firms 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.351 0.359 0.155 0.156 0.158  0.459 0.458 0.461 0.187 0.186 0.194 




Table 8  Borrowing firm cash-flow rights dispersion across large owners 
 
This table presents regression results on the effect of borrowing firm cash-flow rights dispersion across large 
owners on the relation between the control-ownership wedge and syndicate structure.  The dependent variables are 
the percentage of loan held by the lead arranger (column 1), the Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares in the loan 
(column 2), the percentage of loan held by all foreign lenders (column 3), and the average syndicate industry expertise 
(column 4).  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow 
rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Cash-flow rights dispersion across large owners is defined as the 
difference between the cash-flow rights of the largest owner and the cash-flow rights of the second largest owner 
(Laeven and Levine, 2008).  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by 
*, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
   (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Syndicate Concentration Syndicate Composition 
  
Percentage of 
loan held by lead 
arranger (%) 
Herfindahl 
index of  
lenders' shares 
  
Percentage of loan 





Control-ownership wedge 96.376 0.319 -103.141 0.951 
[0.008]*** [0.002]*** [0.015]** [0.002]*** 
Cash-flow rights dispersion 82.677 0.260 -56.595 0.375 
[0.012]** [0.000]*** [0.016]** [0.003]*** 
Cash-flow rights dispersion x Wedge 204.716 0.683 -144.172 1.973 
[0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.015]** 
Cash-flow rights -17.160 -0.056 18.274 -0.112 
[0.033]** [0.032]** [0.034]** [0.053]* 
Leverage 15.087 0.067 -30.551 0.336 
[0.059]* [0.377] [0.063]* [0.461] 
Tangibility -12.140 -0.033 11.473 -0.138 
[0.183] [0.035]** [0.011]** [0.394] 
Log assets -0.538 -0.004 0.487 -0.023 
[0.030]** [0.257] [0.187] [0.011]** 
Profitability -148.678 -0.411 17.796 -1.752 
[0.051]* [0.032]** [0.064]* [0.267] 
Cash-flow volatility 2.402 0.009 -0.222 0.026 
[0.134] [0.022]** [0.149] [0.129] 
S&P rating 6.174 0.021 -2.091 0.116 
[0.023]** [0.070]* [0.241] [0.017]** 
No rating dummy 6.201 0.029 -15.761 0.119 
[0.079]* [0.165] [0.033]** [0.011]** 
Q -3.250 -0.018 1.595 0.017 
[0.166] [0.425] [0.539] [0.156] 
 









Table 8  Borrowing firm cash-flow rights dispersion across large owners 
(Continued) 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Syndicate Concentration Syndicate Composition 
  
Percentage of 
loan held by lead 
arranger (%) 
Herfindahl 
index of  
lenders' shares 
  
Percentage of loan 





Performance pricing dummy -4.334 -0.027 11.411 -0.127 
[0.134] [0.070]* [0.032]** [0.088]* 
Term loan dummy 13.804 0.053 -7.679 0.120 
[0.176] [0.031]** [0.207] [0.012]** 
Log loan size -4.907 -0.026 8.523 0.041 
[0.037]** [0.012]** [0.060]* [0.163] 
Log loan maturity -10.972 -0.058 -7.012 0.133 
[0.021]** [0.065]* [0.051]* [0.148] 
Sovereign risk rating 11.920 0.031 -12.920 0.074 
[0.074]* [0.408] [0.185] [0.140] 
Private credit to GDP -2.299 -0.027 16.328 0.037 
[0.053]* [0.088]* [0.183] [0.019]** 
Log GDP per capita -15.371 -0.043 2.923 -0.045 
[0.284] [0.363] [0.247] [0.133] 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 
Number of firms 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 
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Table 9  Legal rights and institutions 
 
This table presents regression results on the effect of legal rights and institutions on the relation between 
the control-ownership wedge and syndicate structure.  The dependent variables are the percentage of loan 
held by the lead arranger (columns 1 and 2), the Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares in the loan (columns 3 
and 4), the percentage of loan held by all foreign lenders (columns 5 and 6), and the average syndicate 
industry expertise (columns 7 and 8).  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the 
control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Anti-self-dealing is an index 
constructed by Djankov et al. (2008), with higher values indicating stronger protection of investors against 
self-dealing by controlling shareholders.  Credit information sharing is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if an information sharing agency operates in the country of the borrower in the observation year 
(Djankov et al., 2007).  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Syndicate Concentration   Syndicate Composition 
  
Percentage of loan held 
by lead arranger (%) 
Herfindahl index  
of lenders’ shares 
  
Percentage of loan held 
by foreign lenders (%) 
Average syndicate 
industry expertise (%) 
Control-ownership wedge 96.337 120.996 0.615 0.562 -123.144 -89.852 0.735 0.823 
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.021]** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** 
Anti-self-dealing -18.308 -0.145 26.242 -0.207 
[0.016]** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.012]** 
Anti-self-dealing x Wedge -90.768 -0.471 121.375 -0.701 
[0.011]** [0.011]** [0.041]** [0.022]** 
Credit information sharing -5.713 -0.029 4.782 -0.038 
[0.014]** [0.023]** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
Credit information sharing x Wedge -57.875 -0.328 51.246 -0.405 
[0.012]** [0.015]** [0.011]** [0.021]** 
Cash-flow rights -17.901 -14.145 -0.100 -0.072 17.457 16.665 -0.364 -0.432 
[0.028]** [0.062]* [0.029]** [0.053]* [0.031]** [0.052]* [0.261] [0.021]** 
Leverage 19.007 22.592 0.094 0.081 -27.826 -31.262 0.186 0.277 
[0.122] [0.063]* [0.141] [0.372] [0.282] [0.062]* [0.722] [0.472] 
Tangibility -20.797 -12.744 -0.033 -0.042 12.912 12.037 -0.072 -0.128 
[0.031]** [0.202] [0.053]* [0.032]** [0.011]** [0.023]** [0.501] [0.362] 
Log assets -0.663 -0.872 -0.003 -0.003 0.611 0.515 -0.018 -0.026 
[0.131] [0.022]** [0.252] [0.033]** [0.037]** [0.081]* [0.023]** [0.021]** 
Profitability -96.556 -104.537 -0.424 -0.599 24.177 19.653 -2.023 -1.291 
[0.071]* [0.037]** [0.132] [0.036]** [0.055]* [0.051]* [0.201] [0.252] 
Cash-flow volatility 2.224 2.455 0.010 0.009 -0.302 -0.183 0.012 0.018 
[0.172] [0.028]** [0.125] [0.026]** [0.061]* [0.119] [0.091]* [0.132] 
S&P rating 7.395 7.898 0.028 0.028 -2.281 -1.623 0.098 0.085 
[0.032]** [0.021]** [0.032]** [0.071]* [0.012]** [0.171] [0.018]** [0.012]** 
No rating dummy 6.282 6.276 0.039 0.024 -23.055 -17.023 0.103 0.104 
[0.081]* [0.083]* [0.028]** [0.112] [0.025]** [0.032]** [0.012]** [0.012]** 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Table 9  Legal rights and institutions 
(Continued) 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Syndicate Concentration   Syndicate Composition 
   Percentage of loan held 
by lead arranger (%) 
Herfindahl index  
of lenders’ shares 
  
Percentage of loan held 
by foreign lenders (%) 
Average syndicate 
industry expertise (%) 
Q -2.424 -5.654 -0.017 -0.020 0.871 1.137 0.155 0.106 
[0.183] [0.083]* [0.713] [0.072]* [0.742] [0.672] [0.131] [0.143] 
Performance pricing dummy -5.176 -5.174 -0.021 -0.024 12.196 12.586 -0.082 -0.072 
[0.019]** [0.011]** [0.072]* [0.070]* [0.021]** [0.022]** [0.093]* [0.063]* 
Term loan dummy 14.434 14.502 0.042 0.055 -10.251 -7.276 0.128 0.114 
[0.172] [0.153] [0.233] [0.023]** [0.022]** [0.242] [0.042]** [0.011]** 
Log loan size -3.892 -4.972 -0.028 -0.023 9.672 8.512 0.057 0.052 
[0.211] [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.012]** [0.023]** [0.072]* [0.021]** [0.172] 
Log loan maturity -10.523 -12.244 -0.044 -0.056 -8.137 -7.512 0.114 0.123 
[0.016]** [0.135] [0.162] [0.073]* [0.063]* [0.071]* [0.023]** [0.021]** 
Sovereign risk rating 12.468 12.714 0.043 0.038 -16.775 -18.257 0.104 0.094 
[0.072]* [0.072]* [0.063]* [0.391] [0.181] [0.151] [0.133] [0.142] 
Private credit to GDP -4.427 -4.926 -0.025 -0.019 18.903 23.625 0.083 0.087 
[0.081]* [0.052]* [0.051]* [0.052]* [0.171] [0.133] [0.031]** [0.021]** 
Log GDP per capita -14.954 -15.517 -0.052 -0.037 3.353 1.803 -0.077 -0.081 
[0.072]* [0.063]* [0.272] [0.313] [0.192] [0.481] [0.141] [0.131] 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 
Number of firms 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 
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Table 10  Financial crises 
 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of financial crises on the relation 
between the control-ownership wedge and syndicate structure.  The dependent variables are the 
percentage of loan held by the lead arranger (column 1), the Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares in 
the loan (column 2), the percentage of loan held by all foreign lenders (column 3), and the average 
syndicate industry expertise (column 4).  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference 
between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Financial 
crisis is a dummy variable that equals one if the country of the borrower is undergoing a financial 
crisis in the observation year, as identified in the IMF Banking Crisis Database.  Definitions of all 
the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by 
firm are reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
 
   (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Syndicate Concentration   Syndicate Composition 
  
Percentage of 






Percentage of loan 





Control-ownership wedge 91.504 0.597 -59.416 0.759 
[0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.034]** [0.002]*** 
Financial crisis 8.715 0.054 -14.835 0.090 
[0.026]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.033]** 
Financial crisis x Wedge 39.992 0.186 -36.181 0.506 
[0.012]** [0.034]** [0.012]** [0.035]** 
Cash-flow rights -12.992 -0.123 16.017 -0.451 
[0.032]** [0.023]** [0.023]** [0.260] 
Leverage 23.404 0.068 -22.135 0.252 
[0.060]* [0.365] [0.167] [0.529] 
Tangibility -8.675 -0.036 12.098 -0.117 
[0.188] [0.032]** [0.031]** [0.367] 
Log assets -0.936 -0.002 0.755 -0.016 
[0.022]** [0.225] [0.056]* [0.032]** 
Profitability -104.380 -0.622 15.675 -1.146 
[0.059]* [0.022]** [0.084]* [0.269] 
Cash-flow volatility 2.320 0.006 -0.179 0.033 
[0.134] [0.031]** [0.079]* [0.123] 
S&P rating 8.386 0.033 -1.749 0.103 
[0.033]** [0.059]* [0.035]** [0.013]** 
No rating dummy 6.794 0.047 -21.175 0.105 
[0.071]* [0.020]** [0.023]** [0.018]** 
Q -4.841 -0.017 1.428 0.107 
[0.159] [0.483] [0.573] [0.147] 
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   (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Syndicate Concentration   Syndicate Composition 
  
Percentage of 






Percentage of loan 





Performance pricing dummy -5.291 -0.018 8.396 -0.048 
[0.021]** [0.087]* [0.123] [0.081]* 
Term loan dummy 14.204 0.052 -8.108 0.113 
[0.118] [0.031]** [0.186] [0.022]** 
Log loan size -4.922 -0.024 8.942 0.047 
[0.020]** [0.012]** [0.062]* [0.166] 
Log loan maturity -12.406 -0.048 -8.132 0.136 
[0.013]** [0.125] [0.062]* [0.031]** 
Sovereign risk rating 11.995 0.051 -15.121 0.101 
[0.064]* [0.334] [0.145] [0.139] 
Private credit to GDP -4.271 -0.030 19.065 0.094 
[0.188] [0.039]** [0.032]** [0.021]** 
Log GDP per capita -15.208 -0.052 4.089 -0.087 
[0.070]* [0.176] [0.149] [0.132] 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,282 8,282 8,282 8,282 
Number of firms 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 
Adjusted R2 0.351 0.156 0.460 0.187 
 
